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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. ] 
Boyd Searle, ] 
Appellee. ] 
) Case No- 20000274-CA 
Priority 4 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
A^ STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellees dispute Appellant's designation of the standard of 
review. In response thereto Appellant would offer the following: 
1. Did the trial court err when it concluded that the 
October 16, 1999 Tribal Court Order was unenforceable 
because it "relates to and stems from" the May 22, 1998 
Order? 
Appellees argue that a Findings of Fact standard should 
apply. However, in the order which was drafted by Appellees and 
approved by the trial court, the contested issue is identified a 
conclusion of law (See Addenda B attached to Appellant's Brief). 
Appellant would concede that if there are adequate findings, the 
Appellate Court decides the matter for itself and does not defer 
to the trial court's determination as to the law. However, the 
1 
determination whether the foreign order is both final and valid 
is a question of law which was left unresolved by the trial court 
in its ruling. 
2. Did the trial court err in setting aside the Entry of 
Judgment under Rule 60(b)? 
Appellant would concede that generally a Rule 60 (b) Motion 
is treated as a discretionary ruling. However, there is no 
discretion where there is no jurisdiction. As to the timeliness 
of the Rule 60(b) Motion, the issue is an issue of law. Given 
the lack of findings, the appellate court cannot determine 
whether there was an abuse of discretion or not. The appellate 
court must either decide the issue for itself or remand for 
further determinations. Willev v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226, 230 
(Utah 1997). Therefore, this issue involves questions of law. 
B. TRANSCRIPT, RES JUDICATA, AND RULE 60(B) ISSUES 
For purposes of this section and consistent with Appellant's 
Brief, Appellant will use: (1) The term "Tribal Court" to refer 
to the Fort Peck Sioux and Assiniboine Tribal Court; (2) The term 
MJuvenile Court" to refer to the Third District Juvenile Court; 
and (3) The term "trial court" to refer to the Third District 
Court from which this appeal was taken. In reply to the issues 
raised in Appellee's Brief, the following is offered: 
ISSUE I: APPELLEES ARGUE "THE APPELLATE COURT MUST AFFIRM 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS BECAUSE 
THE MOTHER FAILED TO PROVIDE A TRANSCRIPT" 
Appellees raise an interesting issue with regard to the 
2 
transcript. The case law and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure are clear that a transcript of pertinent 
evidence is necessary. In the instant matter, a transcript of 
November 23, 1999 hearing was unnecessary. Appellees fail to 
identify critical facts that reveal that the transcript was 
unnecessary. A review of these facts is as follows: 
Purpose of the November 23, 1999 Hearing 
Appellees failed to properly identify the issues addressed 
at the November 23, 1999 Hearing. On or about the 18th day of 
November, 1999, Appellees contacted the Court and requested that 
a hearing be scheduled for November 23, 1999 on an "EXPEDITED MO 
TO STAY." See Docket at Page 4 (attached as Addenda C). On or 
about November 22, 1999, Appellees drafted and served Appellant 
with a copy of an "Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Rule 60 
Motion." See R. at 151 & 168. Appellees "Emergency Motion for 
Stay Pending Rule 60 Motion" was filed on November 22, 1999. See 
R. at 151 and Docket at Page 4. 
On November 23, 1999, a hearing was held to address "the 
Motion to Stay Enforcement."1 The "Emergency Motion for Stay 
1
 Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
Appellant would request that the Court take judicial notice of the 
transcript of the November 23, 1999 Hearing. (A copy is attached as 
Addenda A hereto). The original has been filed with the Court. 
Under Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, "judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding." The Original Transcript filed 
herein satisfies "necessary information" requirement. The transcript 
is "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ... capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to" the recording. 
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Pending Rule 60 Motion" specifically requested that the Court 
stay enforcement of the August 23, 1999 Entry of Judgment so that 
argument could be made on the "motion to set aside." See R. 151. 
Nowhere in the record does it state that the hearing was held to 
address the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside.2 The order from the 
November 23, 1999 Hearing provides that the Court only issued a 
temporary stay "until further order of the Court." See R. at 445 
(attached as Addenda B). The minute entry from the hearing also 
states that the hearing was scheduled on the "motion to stay 
enforcement." See R. at 324 (attached as Addenda C) .3 The clear 
2
 References to the transcript are footnoted because the 
Court has discretion to take judicial notice of the transcript. 
Such discretion has not been exercised. A review of the 
transcript also reveals that the was set to address the Motion 
for Stay. The following language from the transcript 
substantiates that the hearing was set to deal solely with the 
Motion for Stay: 
Page 2, Ln 18-20: Ms. Santana: Your honor, it's very simple. 
I have a motion to stay enforcement of an order 
that you entered on August 23rd. 
Page 13, Ln 1: I'm going to grant a stay. 
Page 13, Ln 9-25: Mr. Shirley: Judge, I'd just like a chance 
to file a written response. 
The Court: To? 
Mr. Shirley: To the pleadings. 
The Court: The motion to stay? 
Mr. Shirley: Yeah. 
The Court: All right. Counsel? Ms. Santana? 
Ms. Santana: Well, I think it's unnecessary, but — 
The Court: What do you mean you think it's unnecessary? 
Ms. Santana: Well, you have - if you're going to look 
at the issue and only order a stay temporarily, I 
don't see wanting to respond to it. 
See also R. at Page 15, Ins 10-17. 
3
 At page 5 of Appellees' Brief, Appellees state that "On 
November 23, 1999, the trial court held a hearing on the 
4 
purpose of the November hearing was to deal with the Motion to 
Stay Enforcement. 
Appellant has not appealed the trial court's grant of the 
temporary order of stay. This Court can presume that the Order 
of Stay was properly entered to give the trial court time to deal 
with the Rule 60(b) Motion as requested by Appellees. However, 
the temporary hearing did not address the propriety of the Rule 
60(b) Motion which was not before the court for decision at that 
time. 
Language of February 7, 2000 Ruling 
The language of the February 7, 2000 Ruling of the trial 
court also substantiates this interpretation. The Ruling states 
"A hearing was held before the Court on November 23, 1999, on the 
Emergency Motion to Stay." R. 616. "At that time, the Court 
granted the Motion to Stay temporarily, but deferred making a 
final ruling on the Motion until counsel for the petitioner had 
an opportunity to respond to the Motion..." R. 616. Based upon 
this language, it is fairly clear that the trial court believed 
grandparents Emergency Motion for Stay and Motion to Set Aside. 
(R.324). After hearing argument at the hearing, the trial court 
granted a stay and took under advisement whether to set aside the 
judgment. (R. 324; 445-447). Nowhere in either part of the 
record is Appellees' statements substantiated. The minute entry 
at R.324 clearly provides that the hearing was on the Motion to 
Stay. The Order and Minute Entry do not state that the Motion to 
Set Aside was taken under advisement. The ten days for 
responding to the Motion to Set Aside had not passed on November 
23, 1999. 
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that the hearing on November 23, 1999 pertained solely to the 
Emergency Motion to Stay filed by Petitioners on November 22, 
1999. Nothing in the ruling indicates that the Court used any 
evidence from the hearing in making her decision with regard to 
the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside• 
The trial court ruling goes on to state "having reviewed the 
moving and responding memoranda with respect to the remaining 
motions, the Court rules as stated herein," R. 617. The Court 
does not state that it relied on the argument made at the 
November 23, 1999 hearing. In fact, nowhere in the record does 
the trial court state that the November 23, 1999 hearing related 
to the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside. Rather, the Court 
explains that it was relying on the written documents submitted 
by the parties. 
Testimony or Evidence at November 23, 1999 Hearing 
A review of the minute entry demonstrates that no oral 
testimony was taken at the hearing.4 There are no references to 
any evidence being taken other than the documents found at R. 
193-323 (which are primarily copies of cases and other orders 
that are found in the record elsewhere-Appellees do not cite to 
any of this evidence as supporting their position). It should be 
clearly noted that Appellees do not argue that evidence was taken 
at the hearing that bears upon the Motion to Set Aside. 
4
 A review of the transcript also shows that no oral testimony was taken. 
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Appellees only argue that the hearing was held and a transcript 
should have been provided. Appellees offer no proffer that there 
was even relevant evidence offered at the hearing. 
Relevant Evidence: Orders 
The only true evidence relevant to the trial court's 
findings and conclusions are: (1) The May 22, 1998 Tribal Court 
Temporary Order (R.526); (2) The October 16, 1998 Tribal Court 
Custody Decree (R. 2-4); (3) The November 19, 1998 Tribal Court 
Order on Order to Show Cause (R. 5-12); (4) Judge Hanson's Order 
of Dismissal (R. 174-77); and (5) Judge Hanson's July 15, 1999 
Letter (R. 378-79). There is no other evidence that is relevant 
to the Rule 60(b) Motion which was submitted to the trial court. 
Appellees do not assert that any other relevant evidence exists. 
There is no parol evidence that changes the documents. A review 
of the ruling makes it clear that Judge Lewis' determination was 
based upon these documents. R. 616-18. 
Utah Rules of App. Proc.: Rule 11 Case Law 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
provides that "if the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript 
of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion." The key 
issue of the rule is whether evidence is relevant to a finding or 
a conclusion. The cases are in uniformity that this Court 
7 
presumes the finding/conclusion to be correct when the evidence 
relevant to such a finding/conclusion is not included. As stated 
in King v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1287 
(Utah App. 1993), Rule 11(e)(2) "requires counsel provide the 
appellate court with all evidence pertinent to the issues on 
appeal," The issue on appeal in the instant matter concerns the 
Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside, not the Appellees' "Emergency 
Motion to Stay Enforcement Pending a Ruling on Rule 60(b) 
Motion." 
On page 9 of their brief, Appellees cite to King, Prudential 
Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104 (Utah App. 1990), and 
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987). These cases are 
readily distinguishable from the instant case in that there were 
identifiable transcripts that were needed, but were not included. 
In King, the appellant had failed to include a transcript of the 
proceedings before an administrative agency. In Prudential/ the 
appellant had failed to include the relevant portions of a 
transcript from the trial. In Fackrell, the appellant failed to 
provide a transcript of hearing on a Rule 60(b) motion. In each 
case, the missing transcript related to issues before the 
appellate court. 
The cases seem to be in uniformity in holding that the 
evidence has to be pertinent to the issues on appeal. See 
Ravburn v. Ravburn, 738 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah App.1987) (appellant 
8 
only provided 30 pages of the transcript from trial which only 
represented a "tiny fraction of the testimony" where the findings 
based upon the testimony was at issue)/ Intermountain Power 
Agency v. Bowers-Irons Recreation Land & Cattle Co., oo» J- /OI 
250, 252 (Utah App.,1990) (appellant failed to provide transcript 
from trial where the findings based upon I. lit- letsl iirumy war ,il 
issue); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah App.,1992) 
(appellant failed to provide copies of the t ranscript front a 
deposition which was central to the appeal issue); State v. 
Bvrns, 91 3 P.2d 981 , 987-88 (Utah App.,1995) (appellant failed to 
provide a transcript of a hearing on an entrapment hearing where 
the issue wair tin out raprnprit ruling); In re C.J.F.T. v. J.W., 
1999 WL 33244660 (Utah App.,1999) (failed to provide a transcri pt 
of the adoption consent proceeding where the viability of the 
consent was the issue on appeal); State v. Simmons, l P ?d 1228, 
1231 (Utah App.,2000) (failed to provide transcript from Rule 23B 
hearing where 23B hearing orders were being contested); Shields 
v. Santana, 2000 WL 33250567 (Utah App.,2000) (Unpublished) 
(Summary Judgment Motion on a 3 ease in which a hearing was held 
and findings entered upon the hearing, appeal issue was adequacy 
of evidence il the hearing); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 
1000 (Utah App. 1989) (Transcripts were not . ,.!*-.-_- -
trial w Mi 23 witnesses and 398 exhibits and I"7 page court 
memorandum and 234 page findings of i : . * ' */* 
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and verdict, issue on appeal were findings). In Santana, the 
Court noted that the ""judgment, which was based upon a hearing, 
found xno merit sufficient to withstand judgment for [Appellee] 
based on any of the affirmative defenses or the one remaining 
counterclaim....' No transcript of the hearing has been provided 
to this court, so t^he trial court's ruling on the evidence must 
be presumed correct.'" citing to Howard v. Howard/ 601 P.2d 931, 
934 (Utah 1979). 
The argument and references to the record set forth herein, 
clearly demonstrate that the hearing had no bearing on the Motion 
to Set Aside. If the Motion had been dealt with in the November 
23, 1999 hearing, Appellees' argument may have some merit. 
Accordingly, Appellees' argument lacks sufficient merit. This 
Court has been given all the evidence relevant to the issues on 
appeal as set forth above. 
ISSUE II: APPELLEES ARGUE "THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
BECAUSE RES JUDICATA BARRED ENFORCEMENT 
Appellant does not dispute that the case law cited to by 
Appellees with regard to Res Judicata contains the applicable 
elements and explanations of the doctrine of Res Judicata. 
Appellant would dispute the application of Res Judicata to the 
matter before the Court. Appellees argue that .Res Judicata 
precluded the trial court from enforcing the October Tribal Court 
Order because Judge Hanson had refused to enforce a temporary 
10 
order of custody in. •.* separate action. Appellees' argument 
assumes that the trial court ruled that Res Judicata applies. 
There i^  no M.irJi J J niicni t" i on in Uie record. 
However, Appellees fail to point out some very distinct 
issues llidt nit * k r Mo- application of the principles of Res 
Judicata inappropriate. First, the issue before the trial court 
in the instant matter and the issue before Judge Hanson in the 
previous matter are distinct. The issue before Judge Hanson 
dealt with the enforcement of the temporary May 22, 1998 tribal 
court order. The issue before Judge Lewis in the instant matter 
dealt with the enforcement of the October 16, 1998 permanent 
Decree of Custody While both sets <.l '\rders /-ire related to 
custody of Appellant's minor child, the issues are different 
because the issue in enforcement ol the order, and enforcement 
relates to the order, not to custody. The following table 
illustrates the differences: 
j JUDGE HANSON ACTION 
Type: Temporary Custody Order 
Notice: Appellees were not 
served with a Motion prior to 
hearing with notice of 
hearing. 
Pleading: Tribe's Ex Parte 
Oral Motion 
Court Proceeding: Hearing on 
Ex Parte Motion 
JUDGE LEWIS ACTION (October) | 
Permanent Order of Custody 
Appellees were served with a 
Petition for Sole Custody See 
R.at 8 (para.27) 
(uncontested). 
Appellant's Written Petition 
for Sole Custody 
Default Judgment, Application, 
and Entry of Default 
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Document: An Order with 
Jurisdictional Findings and 
Temporary Custody Transfer 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law 
Issue Before Utah Court: Did 
the May 22, 1998 order comply 
with the validity and finality 
requirements under the Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act. 
Issue Before Utah Court: Did 
the October 16, 1998 order 
comply with the validity and 
finality requirements under 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, 
As demonstrated by the table, there are several distinctions 
that have to be looked at between the October and May orders. 
Despite Appellees' assertions to the contrary, the action before 
Judge Lewis did not involve the same issue because the order was 
different. The action did not involve the issues which Judge 
Hanson found to preclude enforcement, to wit: (1) A lack of 
notice; and (2) Lack of compliance with the Foreign Judgment Act. 
Res Judicata is not applicable to the instant matter, even though 
the parties are the same because the issues are different as they 
relate to each order. 
The second issue that Appellees conveniently ignore and do 
not argue to the Court is that Judge Hanson found that: 
the above-entitled action is dismissed without 
prejudice as to any Order entered subsequent to the May 
22, 1998 Order which has been entered by the Fort Peck 
Tribal Court and the dismissal of this action in no way 
precludes subsequent enforcement of Orders through a 
filing under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act... See R. 
at 177 (para. 3 of Order) (emphasis added). 
Contrary to Appellees' assertions, the validity of the May 
22, 1998 Tribal Court Order has nothing to do with the 
12 
enforcement of the subsequent permanent orders (as noted by Judge 
Hanson) and the subsequent orders do not countermand Judge 
Hanson': Order. The orders were entered prior to Judge Hanson's 
Order. Judge Hanson did not find that the subsequent proceedings 
lacked due process or that his order would preclude enforcement. 
In fact, Judge Hanson found just the opposite ( i 
order did not preclude subsequent enforcement). Appellees never 
appealed this ruling. As a fu] 1 y ] Itigated and undi sturbed 
ruling, Judge Hanson's ruling does have Res Judicata effect and 
is the 1 riw nf the case as between tiie pail ies with regard to that 
specific ruling5. 
The 01 il :;y i ssi les w:i t h regard to the October Decree is whether 
the order complied with the validity and finality requirements of 
the foreign judgment act. Since res judicata is inapplicable, 
this court should focus on the validity and finality analysis 
required under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, There are no 
findings as to this issue. However, through their silence, 
Appellees appear to concede that the validity and finality 
requirements of 11 Ie I J1:a 1 i F o r e i gn Judgment Ac 1: were satisfied. 
5
 Appellees take some issue that this action was 
commenced after Judge Hanson denied enforcement of the May 22, 
1998 Tribal Court Order. However, Appellees were aware that 
Judge Hanson in a hearing on March 9, 1999 stated that he 
expected that the October and November Orders would be filed in 
accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act and that Mone of 
his colleagues'' would deal with it appropriately. This intent 
was confirmed in a subsequent letter. See R„ at 370. 
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The trial court's order does not address these two core 
requirements. There is no evidence before this Court or the 
trial court which would dispute that the October custody order 
was both final and valid. The issues are all based upon 
documentary evidence which this Court can decide as easily as the 
trial court (in that there is no need for testimony). This Court 
can either remand on that issue or decide the issue for itself 
after disposing of the res judicata and "relates to and stems 
from'' issues. 
ISSUE III: APPELLEES ARGUE "TRIAL COURT'S ORDER SETTING 
ASIDE JUDGMENT MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION'7 
Appellees argue that the appropriate standard of review is 
abuse of discretion in relation to a Rule 60(b) Motion. 
Appellant does not dispute that this would be the general rule. 
However, whether the Rule 60(b) Motion is timely or not is not a 
matter a of discretion. Rather, this involves a question of law 
which does not allow deference to the trial court. With regard 
to the grounds for a Rule 60(b) Motion, the trial court is given 
discretion in determining whether the Motion should be granted. 
In the instant matter, as argued below, the Motion was not filed 
in a timely manner and the trial court failed to make appropriate 
factual findings. Appellant sets forth Appellees' four separate 
arguments in this regard as set forth below: 
Argument #1: Appellees Argue That Appellees' Motion to Set 
Aside Was Timely 
14 
Appellees argue in essence i hat because 1 hr Anqnst ??*, 1999 
Entry of Judgment stated that the Tribal Court Order was given 
full faith and credi t, the date for filing a Motion to Set Aside 
would run from the August 25, 1999 Order and not from an earlier 
date However, this argument ignores the central crux of 
Appellant's argument below in the trial court and on appeal 
before this Court The central crux of the argument is that if 
Appellees wanted to prevent the order fioin gaining tu.ll fcutii and 
credit, Appellees had to file within one hundred twenty days 
(ninety days for Rule 60(b) and thirty days for the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act) of the filing of the foreign judgment action. 
The Utah Foreign Judgment Action is very clear that the 
Appellees, as the judgment debtor, had thirty days to obtain a 
stay of the order. Under Utah Code Anno. § 78-22a-2 provides 
that: 
A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the 
same effect and is subject to the same procedures, 
defenses, enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings 
for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying as a 
judgment of a district court of this state. 
Under tlie Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the foreign judgment 
obtains the status of a lien if a stay of execution is not 
granted with the thirty days. See Utah Code Anno. §§ 78-22a-l & 
4 Under this scheme, the Tribal coin L mdei^ became effective 
on July 15, 2001, thirty days after filing. If tribal court 
orders had been monetary j udg inei Its (as i s g e n e i a 1 1 ;v con 1:eiiip] at< E ;d 
by the language in the Foreign Judgment Act), Appellant would 
have had the right to file a Writ of Execution or Garnishment 
after the thirty days. In such a case, the appeal of the full 
faith and credit issue would lie when the judgment became 
recognized with the same enforcement as a Utah Judgment. 
By the same token, the Tribal Court Orders became effective 
after thirty days filing and any Motion to prevent the full faith 
and credit from attaching must have been filed within 90 days of 
the effective date. Unlike a Writ of Execution or Garnishment, 
there is no formalized mechanism for enforcing a custody order. 
The preferred mechanism is through a directive to law 
enforcement. The Entry of Judgment provided such a mechanism. A 
review of the Application for an Entry of Judgment (attached as 
Addenda G of Appellant's Brief) clarifies that Appellant's 
position has always been that the Entry of Judgment was merely 
the enforcement mechanism. 
Contrary to Appellees' argument, the statutory framework 
governs the time periods, as was argued before the trial court. 
The Order does state that the tribal court decree was given full 
faith and credit, but that is only an announcement to the world. 
The statute provides that the full faith and credit begins after 
thirty days when enforcement may begin. 
As stated in the last sentence of the Entry of Judgment, the 
primary purpose of the order was to direct law enforcement to 
16 
enforce th>. . - i*:. Tl le Entry correctly states that the thirty 
days had passed and that the order was given full faith and 
credi t, Appe] 1 ee's ar gument in this regard is incorrect. It 
should also be noted that the trial court did not make any 
conclusion as to the timeliness of the Motion This would be 
governed by the law set forth in Argument #4 julid. 
Argument #2: Appellees Argue That The Timeliness Issue Is 
Frivolous 
Appellant' s arg umei it i s not fi i vol oi is as defi ned by Rule 33 
because the time periods are governed by the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act, not t he Kntry of Judgment. Appellees ignore the 
Utah Foreign Judgment Act throughout their argument and fail to 
address the core issues in relation thereto. Appellees also do 
not cite the court to the key statemei it in I. he AppJ i Cdt i mi for 
Entry of Judgment (R. 67) , "petitioner hereby requests that the 
Court enter the foreign judgment for enforcement m nt. ah, ." 
Appellant's argument is not frivolous in that it is grounded in 
fact and law. 
Law enforcement should refrain from enforcing a foreign 
judgment absent some declaration by a Utah Court. This policy is 
in line with the Foreign Judgment Act. 
17 
Argument #3: Appellees Argue that Sufficient Grounds To 
Set Aside Must Be Presumed In That Appellant 
Did Not Provide Transcript 
Appellant would incorporate by reference the argument set 
forth in Section I supra as to the need for a transcript. This 
issue is not meritorious in that the issues decided in the Rule 
60(b) Motion were determined upon the pleadings before the Court. 
The record currently before the Court is clear that no evidence 
was taken as to the Rule 60(b) Motion at the November 23, 1999 
Hearing. Accordingly, this issue does not prevent the Court from 
addressing the issues raised by Appellant on appeal. 
Argument #4: Appellees Argue that Appellant Did Not 
Preserve Issue For Appellate Review 
Appellees argue Mthe appellate court cannot reverse on this 
issue [trial court's failure to make findings as to the specific 
Rule 60(b) Motion grounds] because the [Appellant] failed to 
preserve the issue by failing to make a timely objection7 in the 
trial court." A modicum of research would have revealed that 
Appellant's argument is clearly frivolous in that it is not 
supported by law and fact. In Sittner v. Schriever, 2 P.3d 442, 
445 (Utah 2000), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
Defendants correctly state the general rule that 
failure to raise an argument before the trial court 
precludes a party from raising that argument on appeal. 
{Citation ommitted). However, this rule does not 
7
 An objection would not have tolled the time for appeal. 
Therefore, a mere objection would have done no good. A Rule 59 
Motion would have been necessary. 
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require a party to file a post-judgment motion before 
the trial court as a prerequisite to filing an appeal. 
See, e.g., Duaan v. Jones, 124 P.2d 955, 956 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam) (" 'It is settled that ... a rule 59 
motion is [not] a condition precedent to appeal from 
final judgment/ (quoting Nature Conservancy v. 
Nakila,4 Haw.App. 584, 671 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Ct. 
App.1983). It would be absurd to require Sittner to 
raise such an issue of appellate procedure before the 
trial court, which would have lacked authority and 
jurisdiction to decide the issue. Moreover, the merits 
of Sittner?s appeal, which we do not address today, can 
be summarized as two issues: (1) whether the trial 
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
defendants, and (2) whether defendants are entitled to 
attorney fees. Sittner!s arguments on these two issues 
are fully briefed in his own summary judgment 
memorandum, his memoranda in opposition to defendants1 
motions for summary judgment, and other pleadings filed 
below. He therefore preserved below the issues he now 
raises on appeal. 
"f'ltf" lssiii-.s regarding the Rule 60(b) Motion were properly 
raised and briefed before the trial court. See Appella . • 
at Pages 2, 30-40. The trial court had ample opportunity t:e ru.e 
on all the issues raised bi I t failed to make appropriate 
determinations as to the grounds for granting a Rule 60 (b) 
Motion. Mosdell v. Mosdell, 2001 WT. 361723, (Utah App. 2001), 
this Court made the following observations: 
"[T]he trial court in exercising its discretion must 
make the findings of fact explicit in support of its 
legal conclusions." Willev v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226, 230 
(Utah 1997). "It is essential that such determinations 
be based on proper findings of fact and conclusions of 
law." Montova v. Montova, 696 P.2d 1193, 1194-95 (Utah 
1985). Here, the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are insufficient to support its 
order modifying the divorce decree. With such meager 
findings, this court cannot meaningfully review whether 
the trial court abused its discretion. See Willev/ 951 
P.2d at 230. 
"Although this Court has power in an equity case such 
19 
as this to weigh the evidence and substitute our 
judgment for that of the trial court, we decline to do 
so where we have no means of knowing upon which facts 
the trial judge relied in entering his judgment," 
Montova, 696 P.2d at 1195 (citation omitted). Thus, we 
vacate the order entered below and remand this case to 
the Search Term Begin trial court Search Term End with 
instructions to Search Term Begin enter Search Term End 
written Search Term Begin findings Search Term End of 
fact. 
Clearly, this Court must either substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court or remand on the issue of the grounds to 
sustain a Rule 60(b) Motion. In Willev v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226, 
(Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that "if the 
appellate court determines that the findings of fact are 
insufficient to support the conclusion, the appellate court 
normally remands the matter to the trial court for further 
proceedings." Appellants concede "the trial court did not enter 
findings or conclusions as to the grounds for setting aside the 
order." See Appellees' Brief at 16. The Rule 60(b) Motion is 
critical to setting aside the Entry of Judgment and a decision 
not to enforce a foreign judgment that had obtained full faith 
and credit. Accordingly, this issue, second only to the grounds 
for denying full faith and credit, is dispositive of the entire 
matter. 
Given the frivolous nature of Appellant's position and the 
little research that would have been required to correctly 
identify the issues to the court, an award of attorneys fees is 
hereby requested on this issue. 
20 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant would ask the Court to either reverse the trial 
court based upon the timeliness issue and fact that Judge 
Hanson's order does not preclude enforcement of the foreign 
judgments. In the alternative, Appellant would request remand 
for further proceedings with the instruction that the ruling that 
the May 22, 1998 order precluded enforcement is erroneous and 
that the trial court must analyze the matter within the rubric of 
the validity and finality issues. 
DATED this j^_ day of nu« o^r , 2.001. 
Counsel for Appellant 
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THE COURT: I don't know if we can do this without 
her being present. I guess we can give it a shot. 
Do you have clients here, Mr. Shirley? 
MR. SHIRLEY: No. She lives in Montana. 
THE COURT: Have we got the video on? 
THE CLERK: It's on. 
THE COURT: Are you there? 
Are you there? 
Are you there? 
MS. SANTANA: I am here. 
THE COURT: All right. We've got the speaker 
phone, obviously, on and also the video recorder. 
This is a motion hearing, so if you want to state 
your position first, Ms. Santana, and then we'll let Counsel 
respond. 
MS. SANTANA: Your Honor, it's very simple. I 
have a motion to stay enforcement of an order that you 
entered on August 23rd. And the grounds for it is that the 
petitioner requested that you enter an order giving full 
faith and credit to the tribal court order that contradicts 
findings and conclusions of law that Judge Hanson has 
already ruled upon on July 26th and insofar as res judicata. 
THE COURT: Well, we looked at the issue, I 
2 
1 
2 
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remember, looked at Judge Hanson's file before I ruled. So 
my perception is it was consistent with Judge Hanson's 
ruling. How do you view it as res judicata? 
MS. SANTANA: Well, Your Honor, Judge Hanson's 
ruling specifically says that the May 22nd order by the 
tribal court is not enforceable and that my clients were not 
given notice or due process when custody was transferred. 
Your order entered the trial court findings that 
my clients were in violation of that order, and that 
contradicts what Judge Hanson has said, that they were not 
provided due process. And it was not enforceable as to 
them. 
THE COURT: Now, in the case before Judge Hanson, 
14 who are the parties? 
MS. SANTANA: Boyd Searle. For some reason, I 
don't know what the reason was, Jayni Searle (inaudible) 
17 I Boyd Searle. 
18 THE COURT: So it's the same parties? 
19 MS. SANTANA: It's one of the same parties. And 
20 I the action before you, she names Boyd Searle and his wife, 
Dorothy Searle. 
22 I THE COURT: So why are the two different actions 
23 pending? 
24 MS. SANTANA: Why are they pending? 
25 THE COURT: Why are there two different actions -• 
1 MS. SANTANA: That you need to ask the petitioner. 
2 He just turned around after Judge Hanson declined to enforce 
3 that May 22nd order and found that it was entered without 
4 due process of law. He said it in open court. When you 
5 entered findings, the petitioner turned around and filed 
6 another action in your court asking specifically that he 
7 give full faith and credit to an order that says the May 
8 22nd, 1998 order was enforceable and that my clients 
9 violated it and, you know, basically that they were 
10 wrongfully maintaining custody of the child as far as that 
H May 22nd order. And that specifically contradicts what 
12 Judge Hanson said. 
13 THE COURT: Counsel? 
14 MR. SHIRLEY: Your Honor, are you ready for my 
15 argument? 
16 THE COURT: Yes. 
17 MR. SHIRLEY: All right. First of all, I've got 
18 these documents and the orders and stuff that went in. With 
19 regard to --
20 THE COURT: You may need to speak up, Counsel. 
21 MR. SHIRLEY: Huh? 
22 THE COURT: You'll need to speak up. 
23 MR. SHIRLEY: Sorry. With regard to the res 
24 judicata issue, in order to be res judicata, you have to 
25 have the same issue or the same claim that's being raised. 
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The May 22nd order was a temporary order that was entered by 
the tribal court upon accepting jurisdiction. 
The October 16th order was issued pursuant to the 
filing of a petition for sole custody in the tribal court on 
September 8th, which was nearly three or four months after 
the May 22nd order. 
Additionally, the -- I think, by analogy, if the 
Court were to look at it, if this Court were to issue --
were to have a petition for custody pending forth and a 
motion for temporary custody and the Court granted the 
motion for temporary custody, and then subsequently went on 
to adjudicate the petition for custody on a more permanent 
basis and for some reason the motion was found to be 
defective and the Court made findings within the 
adjudication on the petition that it had granted the motion, 
that wouldn't make the subsequent order granting the 
17 | petition defective. 
18 I The May 22nd involved custody but it did not 
involve permanent custody as the October 16th order does. 
They're two different claims, they're two different issues, 
and --
THE COURT: The same child, isn't it? 
MR. SHIRLEY: It's the same child. 
THE COURT: And the issue was custody in both 
cases, isn't it? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1 THE COURT: It is. But the second one was based 
2 upon the petition for custody, which was served upon 
3 respondent's counsel. The first one was based upon, what, 
4 an ex parte motion by Mr. Gary Bowdrey of the tribal court 
5 when they accepted jurisdiction. There were two different 
6 pleadings. The only thing that ties them together at all 
7 is, number one, they were in tribal court. Number two, they 
8 involved custody. And, number three, the tribal court made 
9 findings that it had previously entered the temporary order. 
But res judicata does not apply in this type of 
situation because their issue -- the claims are not the 
same, the issues are not the same. 
THE COURT: How are the claims and issues 
different? 
MR. SHIRLEY: Okay. The issues are different on 
the May 22nd order because the claim was that it was 
17 defective because they didn't have notice of the 
18 
19 
20 
21 
proceedings. The October 16th order was based upon a 
petition which respondent's counsel was served with. 
THE COURT: And the underlying issues had to do 
with custody, right? 
22 | MR. SHIRLEY: They did. They did. 
23 I THE COURT: In this case, it's the same thing. 
24 MR. SHIRLEY: That's the same thing, but what 
25 I you're looking at is that May 22nd order's never been set 
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aside. And just because the court -- the tribal court makes 
a finding that it entered that order, that doesn't make the 
adjudication on the petition for custody invalid. It would 
be similar -- like I said, if this Court had entered a 
temporary order and then, later, in its permanent findings 
it says, "Here's the procedural history of this case. We 
entered an order on this date; it hasn't been complied 
with," even if subsequently that order is set aside, that 
temporary order, it doesn't impugn the final order. 
THE COURT: But the point that I can't get past is 
it seems like this all should have been handled in one case. 
12 Why have we got two different cases, same thing? 
MR. SHIRLEY: Well, and what we did is we filed a 
14 petition for writ of assistance before Judge Hanson in June 
of 1998. That was before the October order was entered. 
The juvenile court action which originated all this, Judge--
17 I or Judge -- let me back up. 
18 There was a juvenile court action which 
19 transferred jurisdiction to the tribal court. The 
20 respondents appealed that transferred jurisdiction. In the 
21 interim, we had filed the petition for writ of assistance. 
22 THE COURT: And that has been the Judge Hanson --
23 MR. SHIRLEY: The Judge Hanson case. When 
24 Judge Hanson saw that the Court of Appeals had not ruled yet 
25 on the appeal, he waited until he had a ruling before he 
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would issue anything. The petition for custody wasn't filed 
until September, after the --at the same time that they had 
dismissed their -- their termination action which they'd 
filed in juvenile court. So the petition came at a 
subsequent time. 
In reality, the petition in tribal court was the 
tribe's, it was not my client's. 
THE COURT: Do you want to respond to that, 
Counsel? 
MS. SANTANA: Your Honor, I have Judge Hanson's 
order in front of me and it specifically says the May 22nd 
1998 order transferring custody is not entitled to full 
faith and credit. 
Mr. Shirley's petition in this court was that you 
give full faith and credit to the tribal court order, which 
specifically contradicts that and says that my client 
17 I wrongfully maintained custody in contravention of the May 
18 J 22nd order. And so you have entered a finding by giving 
ig i full faith and credit to that, that the May 22nd order was 
20 wrongfully disobeyed by my client 
21 J THE COURT: All right. Where is 
22 I MS. SANTANA: (Inaudible). 
24 now? 
THE COURT: Where is the child or the children 
MS. SANTANA: Your Honor, Mr. Shirley went to the 
8 
child's school when he -- this is what I understand. He 
went to the school and picked him up and gave him over to a 
person from the Indian tribe to transport him to Montana. 
In the process, that person decided that he was not going to 
transport him and dropped him off at the house of a 
relative. 
THE COURT: Let me ask again: Where is the child 
or the children? Do you know, Mr. Shirley? 
MR. SHIRLEY: I don't know. They won't disclose 
that. 
MS. SANTANA: He's at the home of a relative, Your 
Honor. And I reported it to DCFS the day that he was 
dropped off. He's not in the custody of my clients, 
however. 
THE COURT: But your clients know where he is. 
MS. SANTANA: My clients know where he is by word 
of mouth. They have not had any involvement in what has 
happened. 
THE COURT: Is there anything else? 
MS. SANTANA: Basically, Your Honor, I disagree 
with Mr. Shirley's explanation of the law. I think that the 
issue is specifically exactly the same issue, the issue that 
he brought before this Court was that you give full faith 
and credit to an order that says that the May 22nd order was 
wrongfully disobeyed. And that issue Judge Hanson has ruled 
9 
1 | upon and said that the May 22nd order is not enforceable and 
2 I not entitled to full faith and credit in Utah. 
3 THE COURT: Well, there's also another case --at 
4 least I assume it's a separate case -- and this was one that 
5 was assigned to Judge Medley and is styled 934903601, Jayni 
6 Searle v. Boyd Carl Searle, where Judge Medley has entered a 
7 decree of divorce dealing with custody issues. 
8 What about that? 
9 MS. SANTANA: The thing there, Your Honor, is that 
that Boyd Searle is actually a different person. That is 
Jayni Searle's ex-husband, who has now died. And my clients 
10 
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12 are the grandparents 
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THE COURT: I see. Would you like to say anything 
further, Counsel? 
MR. SHIRLEY: I would, Your Honor. 
In Crowther v. The District Court of Salt Lake 
17 I County, 54 P.2d 243 Utah 1936, the court held that: 
18 " Disobedience of an order made by the court within its 
19 J jurisdiction and power is contempt, although the order may 
20 l be clearly erroneous. Consequently, the authorities are 
21 made in accordance that, where the court has jurisdiction 
22 over the parties and of the subject matter of a suit and the 
23 legal authority to make the order, a party refusing to obey 
24 it, however erroneously made, is liable for contempt. Such 
25 I order, though erroneous, is lawful within the mfeaning of 
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contempt statutes until it is reversed by an appellate 
court. 
"The fact that a witness may disagree with the court on 
the propriety of its ruling, of course, is no excuse for not 
complying with it. The proper method for challenging the 
correctness of an adverse ruling is by appeal and not by 
disobedience." 
THE COURT: Well, there's no question about that 
being the state of the law. But at this point in time, what 
I'm more interested in -- far more interested in than 
assessing who's in contempt and why is making a 
12 determination of what the proper method of the stating is, 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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And I'm not at this point in time. I'm inclined to grant 
the stay, not agreeing to either of your positions beyond 
that, and take a closer look at where we are and whether a 
second file should have been set up or whether everything 
was taken care of in the preceding action. And I'm not sure 
18 I what the answer is. 
19 MR. SHIRLEY: Can I also give you this letter from 
20 J Judge Hanson in which he addressed this complaint of 
2i | bringing the -- excuse me -- of bringing the subsequent 
22 I matter. And in it he says, "With regard to the complaints 
23 
24 
of Ms. Santana that Mr. Shirley has brought this matter 
before Judge Lewis, please be advised that I do not find any 
25 impropriety in that regard, as it was my intention to only 
11 
address the May 22nd, 1998 order and the writ of assistance 
that was requested based thereon. 
"If any subsequent order has been properly domesticated 
under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act and is otherwise 
enforceable, I am confident that Judge Lewis, who apparently 
is assigned to the case, will handle the matter in 
accordance with the facts as she finds them in accordance 
with the law." 
So even Judge Hanson didn't believe -- understood 
that there would be a subsequent action. 
MS. SANTANA: May I respond to that, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. SANTANA: Judge Hanson, however, is stating 
there that he's only dealing with the May 22nd order. 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MS. SANTANA: He's not looking at those other 
orders, and those other orders specifically have findings 
within them that say that the May 22nd order was proper and 
that my clients disobeyed it. And so he's not dealing with 
the issue on the merits; he's basically saying that if there 
are other orders that are otherwise enforceable, that is 
something that you would decide. 
THE COURT: Well, right. I think that was 
Counsel's position, that what Judge Hanson had dealt with 
did not dispose of all the issues. 
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I'm going to grant a stay. I would like 
immediately for the information, however, about the 
whereabouts of the child to be shared so everybody has that 
information. And I will take this under advisement and look 
at it and see if we've erred or if we're on the right track 
here. 
Is there anything either of you would like to say 
in response to that? 
MR. SHIRLEY: Judge, I'd just like a chance to 
file a written response. 
THE COURT: To? 
MR. SHIRLEY: To the pleadings. 
THE COURT: The motion to stay? 
MR. SHIRLEY: Yeah. 
THE COURT: All right. Counsel? Ms. Santana? 
MS. SANTANA: Well, I think it's unnecessary, 
but --
THE COURT: What do you mean you think it's 
unnecessary? 
MS. SANTANA: Well, you have --if you're going to 
look at the issue and only order a stay temporarily, I don't 
see wanting to respond to it. 
THE COURT: Because he's entitled to state his 
position just as you were. 
MS. SANTANA: Okay. Thatf s fine. 
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THE COURT: In writing, as well as orally. 
How long do you need, Counsel? 
MR. SHIRLEY: I just need until Monday. 
THE COURT: I'll give you a week to file that, and 
I will look again at Ms. Santana's pleading and yours, and 
I'll consider what both of you had to say today. And in the 
meantime, we'll pull Judge Hanson's case, which I don't have 
before me. 
9 It seems to me that we did look at the earlier, 
but we'll do it again and make sure that we're correct in 
the meantime with the very short-term stay in place to allow 
me to revisit the issue. 
13 I Anything further? 
14 MS. SANTANA: Well, Your Honor, I do have one 
15 I question 
16 i THE COURT: Yes, 
17 I MS. SANTANA: My clients do know where the child 
18 is 
19 THE COURT: Yes. 
20 MS. SANTANA: And they have not had any contact 
21 with him because they don't want to, in any way, disobey the 
22 Court's order. Are they now authorized to have contact with 
23 him? 
24 THE COURT: No, 
25 MS. SANTANA: Excuse me? 
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THE COURT: No. 
MS. SANTANA: No? 
THE COURT: We're not changing anything, we're 
just staying things at the moment to determine whether or 
not the Court has erred, whether or not things need to be 
adjusted. But I do think that all sides ought to be in the 
same position vis-a-vis information about the child. 
Everybody's entitled to know where the child is. 
MS. SANTANA: Okay, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And do you want to do an order, 
Ms. Santana, covering what we've worked on today, or some 
little issue we've addressed? In the meantime, I'm going to 
take full benefit of the excellent pleadings that have been 
filed by you and what I assume Mr. Shirley may be filing in 
addition and make sure that I have not erred and take 
another look at this. Because I want to be sure I'm 
correct. And I appreciate your calling it to my attention. 
Is there anything further? 
MS. SANTANA: Your Honor, just one little, small 
issue that I'd like to address. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. SANTANA: And that's as to how they would 
serve your pleadings. Mr. Shirley has recently begun 
sending me everything certified mail and recently has sent 
me something, and I don't know if it's in this case or not, 
15 
that I 
office 
was 
yes 
service to 
you saying 
certifd .ed 
not able to get because 
terday when 
be by mail 
THE COURT: 
you'd like 
mailing, if 
it came. And 
there was no one at 
I would just like 
Well, certified mail is by mail. 
a simple mail 
he chooses to 
ing as well as a 
use certified mail 
the 
Are 
P 
MS. SANTANA: Exactly. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. SANTANA: Because now I'm in the position of 
having to go to the post office to go pick up the mail now. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I think that's a 
reasonable request. If Mr. Shirley wants to use certified 
mail, he's welcome to do that, but I'm going to ask you also 
to send via regular mail the same pleadings. 
MR. SHIRLEY: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Okay? Anything else, counsel? 
MS. SANTANA: That's all. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.) 
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44 West Broadway, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-5803 
/ " - \ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAYNI SEARLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOYD SEARLE, and : 
DOROTHY SEARLE,. : 
Defendants. : 
: ORDER OF STAY 
Case No. 99-690-7234FJ 
Judge: Leslie Lewis 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on November 23, 1999, before the 
Honorable Leslie Lewis, Third District Court Judge, pursuant to Respondent's 
Emergency Motion for Stay. Present at said hearing were Jim C. Shirley, counsel for 
Petitioner; and Maria Cristina Santana, counsel for Respondents via telephone. The 
Court having reviewed the pleadings, and the Court having heard argument by the 
respective parties and being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Court's August 25, 1999 Order entitled "Entry of Judgment" is 
stayed and shall not be enforced by the parties or law enforcement until further order of 
the Court; 
2. Petitioner and Respondents shall share information regarding the minor 
child so that the parties have equal access to information regarding the child. 
/ •' SE-
DATED this _ £ day of W-*- 1999 &u
Approved as to form 
K... 
Jim C. Shirley 
BYTH^GOURT 
Honorable Leslie Lewis 
Third District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this^yday of /\}w 1999,1 caused to be served by mail 
and fax a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Jim Shirley 
9 East Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fax: 359-0181 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, 
Appellees. 
Case No. 20000274CA 
Appellant's Reply Brief - Addenda C 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAYNI SEARLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOYD SEARLE Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
LAW & MOTION 
Case No: 996907234 FJ 
Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Date: November 23, 1999 
Clerk: 
PRESENT 
chells 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JIM C SHIRLEY 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARIA CRISTINA SANTANA 
Video 
HEARING 
TIME: 10:50 AM At this time the motion to stay enforcement of 
the order is argued to the court. 
Based on the arguments, the Court grants the motion to stay. 
The Court will look at the issue of the second filing of a 
complaint, and make a determination if the Court has erred or if 
there needs to be an adjustment in the Courts ruling. 
Mr Shirley may file a written response to the motion to stay. 
Ms Santana is to disclose the location of the child. All parties 
are to know where the child is at. 
There is no changes as to the status of contact with the child. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, ] 
Appellees. ] 
\ Case No. 20000274CA 
Appellant's Reply Brief - Addenda D 
THIRD DISTRICT COUKT - B>IA-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAYNI SEARLE v s . 
CASE NUMBER 996907234 F o r e i g n Judgment 
CURRENT ASSIGNED J ^ G E 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - JAYNI SEARLE 
P O BOX 702 
Wolf Point, MT 59201 
Represented by: JIM C SHIRLEY 
Defendant - BOYD SEARLE 
4906 South 4460 West 
R ^ e s e n ^ b y f MARIA CRISTINA SANTANA 
Defendant - DOROTHY SEARLE 
4906 South 4460 West 
Reams, UT 84118 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
15.00 
15.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION 
Amount Due: 2 
Amount Paid: 2 
Amount Credit: ° Balance: 
00 
,00 
.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: n 
Amount Paid: l-°? 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0-00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION 
Amount Due: n 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: °-00 
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Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: 3.00 
Amount Paid: 3.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: 3.50 
Amount Paid: 3.50 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.75 
Amount Paid: 0.75 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.75 
Amount Paid: 0.75 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
06-15-99 Judge LEWIS assigned. susies 
06-15-99 Filed: Affidavit of Impecuniosity susies 
06-15-99 Filed: Complaint susies 
06-15-99 Filed: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree (from 
Fort Peck Tribal Court) susies 
06-15-99 Filed: Order Re: Order to Show Cause (from Fort Peck Tribal 
Court) susies 
06-15-99 Filed: Affidavit in Support of Entry of Foreign Judgment susies 
06-15-99 Filed: Notice of Judgment (copy of file mailed to defendants) susies 
06-15-99 Case Disposition is Judgment on Pleading susies 
Disposition Judge is LESLIE A. LEWIS susies 
06-24-99 Filed: Response to notice of judgment and affidavit in support 
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)6-24 
)6-25 
)6-25 
37-06 
3 8 - 1 3 
3 8 - 1 3 
3 8 - 2 5 
- 9 9 
- 9 9 
- 9 9 
- 9 9 
- 9 9 
- 9 9 
- 9 9 
0 9 - 0 8 -
1 0 - 0 4 -
1 0 - 0 4 -
1 0 - 0 4 -
1 0 - 0 4 -
1 0 - 0 4 -
1 0 - 0 4 -
1 0 - 0 4 -
1 0 - 0 4 -
1 0 - 2 2 -
•99 
•99 
•99 
•99 
•99 
•99 
•99 
•99 
99 
99 
10-26-99 
11-03-
11-03-
11-09-
11-09-
11-09-
11-09-
11-09-
11-09-
11-10-
11-10-
11-12-
11-12-
11-12-
11-12-
11-12-
11-12-
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
-99 
of entry of foreign judgment janeilm 
Filed: Response to notice of judgment and affidavitin support 
of entry of foreign judgment chells 
Filed: Notice of intent to file responsive pleading to 
respondent's pleadings janeilm 
Filed: Objection to June 21, 1998 Letter & motion to strike 
June 21, 1998 letter janeilm 
Filed: Memorandum in support of entry of foreign judgment and 
in response to motion for consolidation margeneg 
Filed: Notice to submit and request for decision chells 
Filed: Application for entry of judgment chells 
Filed order: Signed Entry of judgment margeneg 
Judge llewis 
Signed August 25, 1999 
Filed: Entry of Judgment § 
Fee Account created 
Fee Account created 
CERTIFICATION 
CERTIFIED COPIES 
Fee Account created 
Fee Account created 
CERTIFICATION 
CERTIFIED COPIES 
2, 
1, 
2, 
3, 
00 
00 
00 
00 
1999 at 03:00 PM 
Total Due: 2.00 
Total Due: 1.00 
Payment Received: 
Payment Received: 
Total Due: 2.00 
Total Due: 3.00 
Payment Received: 
Payment Received: 
TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER scheduled on October 26, 
in Fourth Floor - N44 with Judge LEWIS. 
TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER Cancelled. 
Reason: ATD requested continuance. 
Filed: Notice of deposition 
Filed: Notice of deposition 
Fee Account created Total Due: 3.50 
Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
CERTIFIED COPIES Payment Received: 3.50 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
CERTIFICATION Payment Received: 2.00 
Filed: Notice of change of address 
Filed: Motion for protective order and motion for attorneys 
fees 
Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
Filed: Response in opposition to motion for protective order 
Filed: Response in opposition to motion for attorneys fees 
Filed: Response in oppostion to motion for protective order 
Filed: Memorandum in support of respone in opposition to motion 
for protective order 
11-12-99 Filed: Response in opposition to motion for attorneys fees 
11-12-99 Filed: Memorandum in support of expedited motion and order to 
compel 
11-12-99 Filed: Ex parte motion for expedited disposition 
margeneg 
nancyka 
nancyka 
nancyka 
nancyka 
heaths 
heaths 
heaths 
heaths 
chells 
chells 
janeilm 
janeilm 
kimbers 
kimbers 
kimbers 
kimbers 
kimbers 
kimbers 
janeilm 
janeilm 
betsyc 
betsyc 
janeilm 
janeilm 
janeilm 
janeilm 
janeilm 
janeilm 
janeilm 
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11-12-99 Filed: Notice of motion for expedited disposition janeilm 
11-12-99 Filed: Request for ruling on motion for expedited disposition janeilm 
11-16-99 Filed: Reply to opposition to motion for protective order and 
motion for attorney's fees janeilm 
11-16-99 EXPEDITED MO TO STAY scheduled on November 23, 1999 at 10:00 AM 
in Fourth Floor - N44 with Judge LEWIS. chells 
11-18-99 Filed: Objection to ex parte motion for expedited disposition 
and motion to compel (request for hearing) janeilm 
11-18-99 Filed: Notice to submit for decision janeilm 
11-22-99 Filed: Amendment to response in opposition to motion for 
protective order chells 
11-22-99 Filed: Emergency motion for stay pending rule 60 motion chells 
11-22-99 Filed: Motion to set aside judgment and motion for declaratory 
judgment chells 
11-22-99 Filed: Memorandum in support of motion to set aside judmgent 
and motion for delcaratory judgment chells 
11-22-99 Filed: Amendedment to response in opposition to motion for 
protective order chells 
11-22-99 Filed: Documents responding to 11/22/99 emergency motion for 
stay chells 
11-22-99 Filed: Unsigned Expedited motion and order to compel chells 
11-23-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law & Motion chells 
Judge: LESLIE A, LEWIS 
Clerk: chells 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JIM C SHIRLEY 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARIA CRISTINA SANTANA 
Video 
HEARING 
TIME: 10:50 AM At this time the motion to stay enforcement of 
the order is argued to the court. 
Based on the arguments, the Court grants the motion to stay. 
The Court will look at the issue of the second filing of a 
complaint, and make a determination if the Court has erred or if 
there needs to be an adjustment in the Court's ruling. 
Mr Shirley may file a written response to the motion to stay. 
Ms Santana is to disclose the location of the child. All parties 
are to know where the child is at. 
There is no changes as to the status of contact with the child. 
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